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Coordination or Consolidation?
Accountable Care Organizations and
Antitrust Policy Under the Medicare
Shared Savings Program
Michael J. Montgomery*
The U.S. health care system is expensive, fragmented, poorly organized, and fails too
often to deliver high quality care that is both accessible and cost efficient. In 2014,
Americans spent an estimated $3.1 trillion on health care, averaging $9695 per capita and
accounting for 17.8% of gross domestic product (“GDP”). Over the course of the next
decade, these figures are projected to increase by an average of 5.8% per year, reaching
an estimated $5.4 trillion and 19.8% of GDP by 2024. In an effort to curb this
unsustainable trend of rising health care costs, Congress enacted the Medicare Shared
Savings Program (“MSSP”) in conjunction with the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) in
2010. The MSSP created a Medicare framework for Accountable Care Organizations
(“ACOs”), a new health care delivery model that promotes health care provider
accountability, cost efficiency, and higher quality care. At the same time, the program
raises serious antitrust concerns in that it facilitates horizontal integration between
competitors, thus perpetuating increased concentrations of provider market power that
allow providers to drive up health care prices. This Note argues that there is a need for
increased vigilance on the part of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in
regulating ACOs participating in the MSSP to prevent the acquisition and exercise of
pricing power. Antitrust enforcement alone remains an inadequate solution to the
problem of provider market power and, accordingly, additional regulatory efforts are
necessary to promote competition and, at the very least, mitigate and contain the
anticompetitive effects of health care market consolidation under the MSSP.

* Senior Articles Editor, Hastings Law Journal; J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California
Hastings College of the Law; B.A. University of California, Santa Barbara. I would like to thank
Professor Jamie S. King, Anne Marie Helm, and The Source on Healthcare Price and Competition for
inspiring and further developing my interest in this topic. I would also like to acknowledge the entire
staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their outstanding work on this volume, and particularly Elizabeth
Lee, Regina Durr, and Traci Aoki from the Notes Team for their comprehensive edits, thoughtful
feedback, and patience throughout the production process. Also, a special thanks to my family,
friends, and Liv for their tremendous love and support throughout law school.
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Introduction
The U.S. health care system is expensive, fragmented, poorly
organized, and fails too often to deliver high quality care that is both
accessible and cost efficient. In 2014, Americans spent an estimated $3.1
trillion on health care, averaging $9695 per capita and accounting for
1
17.8% of gross domestic product (“GDP”). Over the course of the next
decade, these figures are projected to increase by an average of 5.8% per
2
year, reaching an estimated $5.4 trillion and 19.8% of GDP by 2024. At
the same time, international comparative studies have shown that
although the United States spends by far the most on health care, the
overall quality of care provided is no better, and is in many respects
3
worse, than that of most other industrialized countries. Indeed, despite
ranking highest in how healthy its citizens perceive themselves, the
United States consistently underperforms on most quality measures
4
relative to other wealthy and developed countries.

1. See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 2014–2024 Projections of National
Health Expenditures Data Released (July 28, 2015) (on file with author).
2. Id.
3. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Health at a Glance 2013: OECD Indicators 107–57
(2013).
4. Id. at 40–41.
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Health policy experts attribute this excess spending to two major
factors: (1) misaligned provider incentives and (2) provider consolidation.
First, under the prevailing “fee-for-service” model for health care
delivery, physicians and hospitals are paid a fee for each test, procedure,
or other service performed. The result is that providers are financially
incentivized to increase the volume of services they deliver, as well as to
recommend unnecessary, duplicative, or more expensive tests and
5
procedures that tend to pay higher insurance reimbursements. Thus,
rather than motivating providers to coordinate care more efficiently,
reduce costs, and focus on quality, the current system fosters a
fragmented, wasteful, and dangerous culture of overutilizing health care
6
services. Second, an ever-growing trend of consolidation among health
care providers has led to problematic concentrations of market power,
which dominant providers can and have leveraged to inflate prices and
7
frustrate market entry by competitors. The consequences of such a lack
of competition and pricing power are reflected in the already irrational
pricing of hospital services, which seldom bears any relation to the cost
or quality of the care provided, and instead fluctuates based on relative
8
bargaining power.
In an effort to resolve the issues of misaligned provider incentives,
inefficiency, and fragmentation, Congress passed the Medicare Shared
Savings Program (“MSSP”) as a part of the Affordable Care Act
9
(“ACA”) in 2010. The MSSP provides a Medicare framework to
facilitate the formation of Accountable Care Organizations (“ACOs”),
groups of health care providers and suppliers that work jointly to manage
and coordinate the entire continuum of care for defined patient
10
populations. By offering financial incentives to cut costs and achieve
quality benchmarks in the treatment of Medicare beneficiaries, ACOs
under the MSSP promote provider accountability and move health care
payment and delivery toward a more cost-efficient model that provides
5. See Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acads., Rewarding Provider Performance: Aligning
Incentives in Medicare 4 (2007) (“The current Medicare fee-for-service payment system is unlikely to
promote quality improvement because it tends to reward excessive use of services; high-cost, complex
procedures; and lower-quality care.”).
6. See id.; see also Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care Fragmentation and
How to Fix It, in The Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care: Causes and Solutions 1 (Einer Elhauge
ed., 2010) (“Individual decision makers responsible for only one fragment of a relevant set of health
care decisions may fail to understand the full picture, may lack the power to take all the appropriate
actions given what they know, or may even have affirmative incentives to shift costs onto others.”).
7. See Robert Berenson, Addressing Pricing Power in Integrated Delivery: The Limits of
Antitrust, 40 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 709, 709–10 (2015).
8. See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 11, 57
(2014).
9. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2016).
10. See Andrew J. Barnes et al., Accountable Care Organizations in the USA: Types,
Developments and Challenges, 118 Health Pol. 1, 2 (2014). For a further discussion of ACOs, see
infra Part I.
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11

higher quality care. However, at the same time, the statutory
requirements that govern Medicare Shared Savings Program
Accountable Care Organizations (“MSSP ACOs”) not only encourage,
12
but in some respects, arguably require consolidation among providers.
Thus, while the MSSP has the potential to shift the U.S. health care
system toward more cost-efficient and patient-centered care, it
simultaneously threatens to spur consolidation and further aggravate the
13
problem of provider market power.
14
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), the
administrative agency that oversees the MSSP and other Medicare
programs, has at least acknowledged the potential for the MSSP to
15
advance problematic market power. For example, within a set of
regulatory amendments to the MSSP in 2011, CMS noted that “the
consolidation of providers to form ACOs could have a significant impact
on the commercial market,” and that hospitals may “use any market
16
power they have to . . . obtain higher rates.” However, the resulting
regulations have done little to nothing to prevent or discourage provider
consolidation in the formation of MSSP ACOs and, moreover, have not
done nearly enough to mitigate the potential to exercise market power
17
once acquired. As opposed to instituting regulatory controls within the
MSSP, CMS instead deferred and entrusted this issue to federal antitrust
18
enforcement. To be sure, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
(collectively “Antitrust Agencies”) have provided useful guidance
19
outlining their antitrust review process, including specific safe harbors
20
and details on what might trigger a more in-depth review. Yet, the
problem with solely relying on this approach is that the efforts of the
Antitrust Agencies to address consolidation and pricing power in the
context of ACOs are inherently limited by the resource and fact11. See Barnes et al., supra note 10.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(D) (2016) (requiring that prospective ACOs have at least 5000
beneficiaries to be eligible to participate in the MSSP); see also Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as
Market-Makers: Accountable Care Organizations and Competition Policy, 46 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 35 (2014).
13. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 22.
14. The CMS was created to administer the Medicare Program and the federal portion of the
Medicaid Program. CMS is also responsible for administering the State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (“SCHIP”), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), and
several other health-related programs.
15. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,841–43 (Nov. 2, 2011) (discussing
commentator concerns over consolidation and market power encouraged by the MSSP).
16. Id. at 67,843.
17. See Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 C.F.R. § 425 (2016).
18. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter
Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy].
19. Id. at 67,032.
20. Id.
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intensive nature of antitrust analysis, as well as the narrow scope of
21
remedies available where anticompetitive conduct is found. In other
words, even though providers forming an ACO might have a number of
compelling justifications to consolidate—and thus, to survive antitrust
scrutiny—the resulting entity might, nonetheless, end up in a position to
later raise prices legitimately, or in a way that is difficult for antitrust
22
remedies to counteract.
Consequently, while antitrust enforcement and policy should
continue to play a significant role, it should not be the only, or even
primary, mode of addressing the consolidation and pricing power
associated with the formation of ACOs. Rather, this Note argues that
there is a need for increased vigilance on the part of CMS in regulating
the entry and ongoing behavior of ACOs participating in the MSSP.
Considering the experimental nature of ACOs and the promise they
have demonstrated thus far, it is important to emphasize that, to the
extent possible, additional regulations should not be so overly
prescriptive as to chill MSSP participation. Instead, new regulations
should focus on establishing protections that prevent the exercise of
pricing power and streamline the antitrust review process whenever
necessary. Given the success and growth of the MSSP in just three
23
years, CMS could leverage eligibility to participate on a number of
mandatory disclosures and agreements that aim to mitigate the potential
harms of exercising market power. In doing so, CMS and the Antitrust
Agencies could better synergize their regulatory and enforcement
schemes to strike the appropriate balance between the rigidity of
mandatory antitrust review and the impracticality of an unused system of
voluntary review. Antitrust enforcement alone remains an inadequate
solution to the problem of provider market power. Accordingly, these
additional regulatory efforts will be necessary to promote competition
and, at the very least, mitigate and contain the anticompetitive effects of
health care market consolidation under the MSSP.
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the origins, structure,
results, and prospects of ACOs under the MSSP. Part II introduces the
problems associated with provider market power in the health care
industry and relates these issues to the implementation of the MSSP. It
then discusses the effectiveness and limitations of the Antitrust Agencies
in addressing the competitive consequences of provider consolidation
associated with ACO formation. Part III recommends modifications to
21. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 38 n.159.
22. As discussed below in Part II.B, the increase in a firm’s scale following a merger may result in
cost-saving efficiencies the Antitrust Agencies must consider in reviewing the transaction’s overall
anticompetitive potential. See Berenson, supra note 7, at 720.
23. Growth and Dispersion of Accountable Care Organizations in 2015, Health Aff. Blog (Mar.
31, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/03/31/growth-and-dispersion-of-accountable-care-organizationsin-2015-2/.
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the current MSSP regulatory scheme that focus on leveraging eligibility
to participate on producing mandatory disclosure and agreements that
would mitigate the potential harms of ACO provider pricing power.
I. Accountable Care Organizations
This Part provides a general overview of ACOs. First, it explains the
concept of ACOs, why they were developed, and how they differ from
similar models of integrated health care delivery. Second, it discusses
how ACOs are structured and operate in the MSSP. Third, it surveys
current empirical data available on the success of ACOs and notes
several key criticisms and challenges the ACO model faces.
A. ACOs: Theory and Origins
The concept of the ACO originated largely in response to the
findings of Professor Elliot S. Fisher and a team of researchers through
24
the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care project. Published in 2003, a study
by the Dartmouth researchers documented wide geographic variations in
health care spending and outcomes across the United States throughout
25
the early 1990s. Significantly, because this study was based on Medicare
spending in which prices are fixed, and because it was able to rule out
other potentially substantial factors such as population health, patient
26
preferences, or the cost of malpractice, the Dartmouth project found
that these deviations were instead the result of differences in supply27
sensitive care utilization and practice style. What is more, the study
established that this greater volume of care, and thus higher Medicare
spending, was associated with neither improved health outcomes nor
28
increased access to health care services. Accordingly, the Dartmouth
researchers concluded that by reducing discretionary geographic

24. See generally Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare
Spending. Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care, 138 Annals Internal Med. 273
(2003) [hereinafter Fisher et al., Regional Variations Part 1] (determining if regions with enhanced
Medicare spending provide better care); Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations
in Medicare Spending. Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction with Care, 138 Annals Internal
Med. 288 (2003) [hereinafter Fisher et al., Regional Variations Part 2] (determining if regions with
enhanced Medicare spending achieve better survival, functioning, and patient satisfaction).
25. Fisher et al., Regional Variations Part 1, supra note 24; Fisher et al., Regional Variations Part
2, supra note 24.
26. Differences in the malpractice environment account for less than ten percent of state
variations in spending. See Fisher et al., Regional Variations Part 1, supra note 24, at 285–86.
27. Supply-sensitive care is a category of discretionary care that varies with a populations per
capita supply of health care resources. In other words, the Dartmouth study showed that where there
were more hospital beds per capita, patients in higher spending regions were hospitalized more
frequently, and that where there were more intensive care unit (“ICU”) beds or computed
tomography (“CT”) scanners available, more patients would be cared for in the ICU or receive CT
scans. Id. at 286.
28. Id. at 273.
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variations in the volume of services provided, the United States could cut
Medicare spending by approximately thirty percent without adversely
29
impacting health outcomes.
Responding to these findings, the Dartmouth researchers
formulated an organizational model intended to restructure the delivery
of health care, as well as shift financial incentives in a way that would move
high-spending geographic regions toward the practices of more cost30
efficient ones. The embodiment of this vision was the ACO, a term
coined by Professor Fisher at a public meeting of the Medicare Payment
31
Advisory Commission (“MedPAC”) in 2006. While providers may form
either public or private ACOs, the basic construct envisions a local entity
consisting of a set of health care providers, including primary care
physicians, specialists, and hospitals, that are “accountable for the cost
and quality of the entire continuum of care delivered to a defined
32
population.” Private ACOs can take on manifold organizational and
33
operational structures, and are outside the scope of this Note. In
comparison, most public ACOs are structured and governed under the
34
framework of the MSSP, as discussed below in Part I.B.
The general concept of an MSSP ACO is perhaps best illustrated by
a comparison to Health Management Organizations (“HMOs”), in that
they offer a network of providers, who will have financial incentives to
35
economize on care. There are, however, significant differences between
36
MSSP ACOs and HMOs. First, providers, not insurers, control MSSP
37
ACOs, and beneficiaries can go to providers outside of their networks.
Second, providers in MSSP ACOs do not bear nearly as much financial
risk as providers in HMOs, who carry as much as 100% of the risk if

29. Id.
30. See generally Transcript of Public Meeting of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(Nov. 8, 2006).
31. See id. at 326; see also Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The
Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26 Health Aff. w44 (2007).
32. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 6.
33. For a discussion of the various structures of private ACOs, see Valerie A. Lewis et al., ACO
Contracting with Private and Public Payers: A Baseline Comparative Analysis, 20 Am. J. Managed
Care 1008, 1009 (2014).
34. See infra Part I.B. The other less prevalent ACO models include: (1) the Pioneer ACO
Model; (2) the Advance Payment ACO Model; and (3) the Next-Generation ACO Model. For more
information on these models, see Innovation Models, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
35. HMOs are a type of managed care organization (“MCO”) that emerged in the United States
in the 1980s with the goal of lowering costs while improving quality. The basic structure consisted of
integrating the insuring of patients with managing the provision of health care to those patients. The
HMO model has faced criticisms for the reimbursement and management frameworks which exacted a
large degree of control over physician autonomy and placed much of the financial risk on physicians.
See Barnes et al., supra note 10, at 4.
36. See Barnes et al., supra note 10, at 4–6; see also Greaney, supra note 12, at 5–7.
37. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 5–7.
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under global capitation arrangements. Third, MSSP ACOs consist of
groups of providers who are directly incentivized through financial
rewards to improve performance, as opposed to HMOs where providers
are mandated to perform a specific way and share a portion of savings
39
with the HMO. Finally, MSSP ACOs are more truly integrated,
operating around shared electronic records, health care guidelines,
quality metrics, and pricing information in a manner that is rare among
40
HMOs. As a result, MSSP ACOs have an increased emphasis on
incentivizing providers to coordinate care and work toward measurable
41
outcomes. Through emphasizing primary care, integrating delivery
systems, pooling resources, and coordinating care, the MSSP ACO model
thus aims to realize care that is not only more efficient and cost-effective,
but also of better quality.
However, while attractive in theory, implementation of the MSSP
ACO model has met resistance and implicates a number of practical
42
challenges. For example, ACO participants, for the most part, continue
to be paid on a fee-for-service basis, meaning conflicts of interests might
43
arise where hospitals own and operate an ACO. For example,
notwithstanding the potential for shared savings, successful ACOs save
money by reducing unnecessary care, which means that hospitals may
44
stand to lose revenue when ACOs succeed. Similar concerns arise with
respect to high-earning specialists who have far more compelling
incentives to maintain high volumes (and incomes), than do, for example,
primary care physicians who use less sophisticated and much less
45
expensive technology. Furthermore, the financial and clinical integration
of diverse groups of entities consisting of physicians in various specialties
raises the question of how to fairly redistribute shared savings earnings in
a manner that can reasonably incentivize a range of health care providers
46
in a given ACO. Policy experts have also posited that providers’ main
purpose in forming ACOs might not be to achieve shared savings at all,
38. See Barnes et al., supra note 10, at 5.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Fisher et al., supra note 31, at w45. See generally Wasif Ali Khan, Accountable Care
Organizations: A Response to Critical Voices, 14 Depaul J. Health Care L. 309 (2012) (arguing that
despite challenging criticisms, MSSP and CMS-sanctioned ACOs can be successful).
43. See Farzad Mostashari, Health Reform and Physician-Led Accountable Care: The Paradox of
Primary Care Physician Leadership, 311 JAMA 1855, 1855 (2014) (explaining that although hospitalbased ACOs also receive shared savings for reducing unnecessary care, those cost reductions are lost
revenue for the hospital).
44. Id.
45. Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable Care Organizations: The Case for Flexible Partnerships Between
Health Plans and Providers, 30 Health Aff. 32, 33 (2011).
46. See id. at 35 (noting that the ability to redistribute incomes within physician communities was
“a challenge that doomed many provider-sponsored managed care efforts in the past”); see also
Greaney, supra note 12, at 9–10.
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but to consolidate and strengthen market power to raise prices.
Moreover, even where market power is not the primary motivation for a
new ACO, it can easily become a difficult to reverse by-product of
otherwise procompetitive consolidation permitted between large
48
providers.
While these are real concerns, proponents of the ACO model stress
that these obstacles are surmountable and should not preclude the
49
organizations from realizing their potential benefits. For example,
Francis J. Crosson, M.D., a senior fellow at the Kaiser Permanente
Institute for Health Policy, contends that the ACO concept is “too vitally
important to fail”—that the model remains the last best hope for a
50
market-driven rationalization of our health care system. If the misaligned
incentives in health care do not change, Dr. Crosson and other health
policy analysts warn, payers will likely be forced into systematic
reductions in payment rates to providers. In response, under the current
fee-for-service environment, providers would likely seek to balance these
51
lower rates by increasing their output of services. Thus, it is perhaps “in
our common interest” to see that ACOs succeed and deliver on their
52
promise of better care at a lower cost. The next Subpart discusses in
depth how ACOs are formed, structured, and operated under the MSSP
to achieve these goals.
B. The Medicare Model: ACOs Under the MSSP
The MSSP, authorized under the ACA, establishes a statutory
framework to test and promote the formation of ACOs serving defined
53
populations of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. In exchange for
reducing medical costs and maintaining quality of care at or beyond
standards specified by CMS, MSSP ACO providers and suppliers receive
54
a percentage share of any cost savings to Medicare. The goal is that
these “shared savings” will incentivize and encourage providers to

47. See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health
Care, 89 Or. L. Rev. 847, 872 (2011).
48. See Berenson, supra note 7, at 720.
49. Francis J. Crosson, The Accountable Care Organization: Whatever Its Growing Pains, the
Concept Is Too Vitally Important to Fail, 30 Health Aff. 1250, 1253 (2011).
50. Id. at 1250.
51. Greaney, supra note 12, at 10.
52. Crosson, supra note 49, at 1254.
53. Barry R. Furrow et al., Health Law: Cases, Materials, and Problems 802–03 (7th ed.
2013). Medicare beneficiaries are “attributed” to the primary care physician from whom they receive
most of their primary care services and assigned to that physician’s ACO. Id. at 803. It is also worth
noting that a beneficiary is not restricted from receiving health benefits from providers outside the
ACO to which she is assigned. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.402 (2016) (“Basic Beneficiary Assignment
Methodology”); see also Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Shared Savings and Losses and
Assignment Methodology Specifications 12 (2015).
54. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(d)(2) (2016).
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implement various service delivery reforms, including the effectuation of
evidence-based medicine, shared electronic health records, joint governance
55
and decisionmaking, and the coordination of care. As discussed below,
while participating ACOs share some core requirements, the resulting
entities can look very different both in structure and organization.
In a broad sense, the MSSP requires participating ACOs to promote
accountability, encourage investment in infrastructure, coordinate the
provision of services, and redesign care processes for high quality and
56
cost-efficient service delivery. Accordingly, the MSSP establishes a
number of eligibility requirements, including that ACOs have: (1) at least
5000 Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries and sufficient primary care
physicians for the number of beneficiaries; (2) a formal legal structure
that would allow the ACO to receive and distribute payments for shared
savings; (3) a leadership and management structure that includes clinical
and administrative systems; and (4) processes to promote evidence-based
57
medicine, report on quality and cost measures, and coordinate care.
These criteria—particularly the minimum beneficiary and reporting
requirements—suggest that the MSSP favors larger, more complex
58
providers such as hospitals. Unless partnering with a hospital, small to
mid-size practices such as a group of physicians would have to make
significant investments to develop the infrastructure necessary to qualify
for the MSSP.
However, despite the fixed eligibility requirements, there is some
flexibility as to how MSSP ACOs may organize themselves in terms of
membership, legal structure, and governance. First, so long as it satisfies
the eligibility prerequisites, the MSSP ACO may consist of any number
and assortment of provider participants, including hospitals, physicians,
59
or specialty groups. For example, the MSSP ACO may be an entire
regional hospital system that owns all participating hospitals and
physician practices, an integrated delivery network that also owns health
plans, or a joint venture arrangement between hospitals and physician
60
practice groups. Alternatively, an MSSP ACO might take the form of a
single independent medical practice association of physicians or a multi61
specialty group practice that owns no hospitals at all. Second, an MSSP
ACO’s legal entity may be structured a variety of ways, including as a

55. See Furrow et al., supra note 53, at 803.
56. Medicare Shared Savings Program § 1395jjj(a)(1).
57. Id. § (b)(2).
58. See Christopher Bays, Scenario Analysis for ACOs and Antitrust 23 (Seton Hall L., Working
Paper No. 151, 2012).
59. See Medicare Shared Savings Program § 1395jjj.
60. See Benjamin Holland Able, The Stark Physician Self-Referral Law and Accountable Care
Organizations: Collision Course or Opportunity to Reconcile Federal Anti-Abuse and Cost-Saving
Legislation?, 26 J.L. & Health 315, 318–20 (2013).
61. Id. at 318–19.
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corporation, foundation, partnership, or any other form permitted by
62
state law. Lastly, the MSSP requires that the ACO formed establish a
separate legal entity with a unique tax identification number (“TIN”)
63
and a governing body of its own. Participants of an ACO must control
at least seventy-five percent of that governing body, including at least
one Medicare beneficiary that does not have a conflict of interest with
64
the ACO.
Finally, MSSP ACOs may choose between three risk models of
potential gain sharing and loss, where the more downside risk an ACO is
willing to take on, the higher the maximum percentage of shared savings
65
it can potentially earn. In the one-sided model (“Track One”), ACOs
bear no financial risk, but are only eligible to receive up to fifty percent
66
of total shared savings. By contrast, ACOs participating in Track Two
share in up to sixty percent of any savings or losses realized, and those in
Track Three share the most financial risk at up to seventy-five percent of
67
losses or savings. CMS determines the total amount of savings an ACO
will actually retain based on a combination of factors. First, CMS
calculates the shared savings or losses relative to a benchmark estimating
the total fee-for-service expenditures beneficiaries would have paid in
68
the absence of the ACO. Second, it determines the percentage of
shared savings in each track based on the ACO’s performance on thirty69
three quality metrics. Lastly, CMS adjusts for the relevant minimum
and maximum savings or loss rates—percentages of the benchmark an
ACO’s savings or losses must exceed to begin qualifying as savings or
70
loss. Thus far, the overwhelming majority of MSSP ACOs have been
reluctant to take on financial risk, and consequently, most opted for and
71
remain in the one-sided risk model. The next Subpart surveys data on
how these ACOs have fared in operating under the MSSP thus far.

62. Id. at 318.
63. See Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 C.F.R. § 425.104(b) (2016) (“An ACO formed by
two or more ACO participants, each of which is identified by a unique TIN, must be a legal entity
separate from any of its ACO participants.”). But see id. § 425.104(c) (“An ACO formed by a single
ACO participant may use its existing legal entity and governing body, provided it satisfies the other
requirements in §§ 425.104 and 425.106.”).
64. See id. § 425.106(c)(1)–(3).
65. See id.
66. Id. § 425.604(d).
67. Id. §§ 425.606(d), 425.604(d).
68. Id. §§ 425.604(d), 425.606(d), 425.610(d) (outlining how to calculate shared savings in each
respective track).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Shared Savings Program 2013 Quality
Results
(Sept.
23,
2014),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/
sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/MSSP-PY1-Quality-Performance.pdf.
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C. MSSP Results and Prospects for Success
While the performance of MSSP ACOs throughout the first two
72
years of the program is promising, the results have been mixed. Of the
220 MSSP ACOs that participated in 2013, most operated under Track
One, with fifty-eight (twenty-six percent) being able to reduce spending
73
enough to qualify for a total shared savings of $315 million. Roughly
another fifty ACOs reduced spending compared to their benchmarks,
74
but not enough to qualify for shared savings. Of the few MSSP ACOs
that opted for Track Two, one exceeded its benchmark by $10 million
75
and owed shared losses of $4 million back to CMS. Two others,
however, each saved Medicare $20 million and $8.5 million, pocketing
76
$12 million and $5 million, respectively. Collectively, MSSP ACOs were
able to reduce spending by $705 million below their financial
benchmarks and, accounting for any losses, saved the Medicare Trust
77
Fund $383 million. As for quality performance, MSSP ACOs were able
to improve in twenty-seven of thirty-three quality measures compared to
78
fee-for-service Medicare.
In 2014, 333 ACOs participated in the program, with all but three
79
ACOs operating under the Track One model. Of these 333 ACOs,
ninety-two contained spending at $806 million below their targets,
80
earning shared savings payments of more than $341 million. Additionally,
no Track Two ACOs owed CMS losses in 2014, and in total, the MSSP
81
saved the Medicare Trust Fund a net $465 million. No ACOs are
currently participating in Track Three, which was finalized in the August
82
2015 regulations and only became available for MSSP contract years
beginning in 2016.
These early results can either be promising or disappointing,
83
depending on one’s perspective. On the one hand, about a quarter of
72. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Shared Savings Program Performance
Year 1 Results (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/
sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/MSSP-PY1-Final-Performance-ACO.pdf; see also Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., supra note 71.
73. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare ACOs Provide Improved Care While Slowing
Cost Growth in 2014 (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Factsheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-08-25.html.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 72.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 C.F.R. § 425 (2015).
83. Scott Heiser et al., Unpacking the Medicare Shared Savings Proposed Rule: Geography and
Policy, Health Aff. Blog (Jan. 22, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/01/22/unpacking-the-medicareshared-savings-proposed-rule-geography-and-policy/.
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participating ACOs in 2013 achieved shared savings in their first year,
reducing the overall cost of care for MSSP ACO beneficiaries by
84
approximately one percent. And on an especially positive note, the 2014
results reflected that ACOs with more experience in the program are
much more likely to generate shared savings, suggesting that increased
85
success under MSSP programs may only be a matter of time. On the
other hand, approximately three-quarters of participating ACOs either
failed to lower spending or did not exceed the minimum savings rate, and
failure to meet quality reporting requirements resulted in ACOs leaving
86
millions in shared savings on the table. To put this into perspective,
under the more rigorous quality benchmark standards that will take
effect in Year Three of the program, CMS would have withheld an
87
additional $71.1 million of the shared savings distributed in 2013. Thus,
while MSSP ACOs generally did well above average for quality, they
stand to lose a significant portion of their expected shared savings if
providers do not make significant improvements in cost and quality
performance. Considering that mandatory transition from one-sided to
two-sided risk models, the sustainability of the entire program could be
at risk if long-term financial success remains an uncertainty for
88
prospective participants.
Another looming concern is whether CMS can strike a balance
between serving its reform goals of lower costs and higher quality health
care in the Medicare program while also preventing anticompetitive
89
spillover into the private sector such as cost shifting. While there are
shared common interests in promoting higher quality care at lower costs,
the regulatory mission of CMS is centered on advancing the goals of
Medicare, and it is at least questionable whether the MSSP will go out of
90
its way to protect the interest of the private market. More specifically,
MSSP ACOs rely upon administrative pricing and command regulation
to control costs, and can be regulated with little concern over promoting
91
provider competition. As a result, in a market where providers are
consolidating and aggregating excess market power in the form of ACOs,
it makes good economic sense that dominant providers with extant
market power might raise prices for private payers to account for lower
84. Mark McClellan et al., Early Evidence on Medicare ACOs and Next Steps for the Medicare ACO
Program, Health Aff. Blog (Jan. 22, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/01/22/early-evidence-onmedicare-acos-and-next-steps-for-the-medicare-aco-program/.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. David Muhlestein & Chase Hall, ACO Quality Results: Good but Not Great, Health Aff.
Blog (Dec. 18, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/12/18/aco-quality-results-good-but-not-great/.
88. 42 C.F.R. § 425.600(b) (2016) (“ACOs may operate under the one-sided model for a
maximum of two agreement periods.”).
89. Greaney, supra note 12, at 15.
90. Id. at 17.
91. Id.
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92

reimbursements under Medicare programs. As discussed below,
competition policy surrounding MSSP ACOs has done little to account
for the risks and implications of facilitating market consolidation.
Although the shared savings model offers a promising transition from
traditional fee-for-service to value-based reimbursements that incentivize
efficiency and quality care, this transformation might prove detrimental
if regulators fail to aggressively prevent or at the least address and
mitigate increasing provider market power.
II. ACOs, Antitrust, and Competition Policy
While aggregation does not generally equal accountability, success
under the MSSP ACO model is to some extent premised on the size and
scale of participating organizations. ACOs must be sufficiently large to
efficiently provide the entire continuum of care to a population; they
need to have the structural framework and capital resources to build
infrastructure and make the investments necessary to achieve
integration; and they need to administer collaborative care that
implements evidence-based medicine, electronic health records, and
quality metrics, all of which must be measured and analyzed to assess
past performance and set future goals. In other words, the MSSP
presupposes at least some degree of provider consolidation in achieving
93
its vision of integrated and coordinated care.
Accordingly, although Congress enacted the MSSP to promote
efficiency and other benefits of vertical integration for Medicare and its
beneficiaries, the program raises serious antitrust concerns in that it
facilitates horizontal integration between competitors, thus perpetuating
94
increased concentrations of provider market power. Where providers
have market power and face less competition, they can and do charge
substantially higher prices, regardless of whether they are not-for-profit.
These increased prices are generally passed off to consumers in the form
of higher insurance premiums, increased cost sharing, and overall
reductions in compensation for those with employer health benefit
95
plans. Furthermore, while Medicare administratively sets public health
prices and generally is not susceptible to pressure from market power,
most MSSP ACOs consist of providers that operate in both the public
and the private market. In other words, if provider consolidation among
large MSSP ACO participants is left unchecked, the market power of the
resulting entity could allow it to raise prices in the private sector that
counteract and overwhelm the goal of reducing costs under the MSSP.
92. See id. at 18–19.
93. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 47, at 871–72.
94. See id. at 872.
95. Martin Gaynor, Competition Policy in Healthcare Markets: Navigating the Enforcement and
Policy Maze, 33 Health Aff. 1088, 1090 (2014).
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This Part introduces antitrust concerns surrounding provider
consolidation in the health care industry and discusses how the Antitrust
Agencies have approached health care antitrust enforcement. First, it
discusses the problems of excess market power and how it can lead to
anticompetitive behavior such as supracompetitive pricing and collusion.
It then provides an overview and analysis of how both the courts and the
Antitrust Agencies have treated health care consolidation, concluding
that antitrust regulation should not be the only, nor the primary, tool in
curtailing consolidation under the MSSP.
A. Antitrust Concerns: Market Power, Collusion, and Unfair
Competition
This Subpart introduces the problems associated with provider
consolidation and market power in the health care industry and relates
these issues to the implementation of the MSSP. First, it provides a
background on the direct relationship between provider market power
and health care prices, explaining how the MSSP could potentially
contribute to the problem and impact the private sector. It then
highlights the risks that come with direct competitors exchanging large
quantities of information on a regular basis, including potentially
anticompetitive behavior such as collusion and price fixing.
1. Provider Consolidation and Market Power
Provider consolidation and market power pose the biggest obstacles
to the success of the MSSP. Over the past several decades, providers
have substantially increased hospital concentration, leaving the vast
majority of Americans subject to monopoly power in their local hospital
96
markets. According to studies by health economists William Vogt and
Robert Town, there is a strong correlation between hospital market
concentration and the growing costs of health insurance, with hospital
consolidation in the 1990s being responsible for inpatient price increases
of at least five and as much as forty percent or more where nearby
97
hospitals merged. In a more recent study, the Massachusetts Attorney
General documented the effects of provider leverage on health care costs
and insurance premiums, finding that “wide disparities in prices are not
explained by differences in quality [or] complexity of services . . . [but]
instead . . . reflect relative market leverage of health insurers and health

96. Barak D. Richman, Am. Enterprise Inst., Beyond Repeal and Replace: Concentration in
Health Care Markets: Chronic Problems and Better Solutions 9 (2012).
97. See Claudia H. Williams et al., Synthesis Project, How Has Hospital Consolidation
Affected the Price and Quality of Hospital Care?, 1, 4 (2006); see also Greaney, supra note 12, at
20.
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providers.” Such increased concentrations of market power translate to
excess bargaining power, enabling dominant providers to raise prices or
99
reduce quality and innovation without consequence.
Because MSSP ACOs might well encourage some mergers, joint
ventures, and alliances that otherwise might not take place, they can
100
exacerbate the problem of market concentration and reduce competition.
This dynamic is made worse by the fact that large hospitals have so far
101
been the dominant providers in the formation of many MSSP ACOs.
For example, in 2013, CMS approved for MSSP participation an
integrated physician organization in Houston, Texas that included two
previously independent hospitals, establishing an ACO with a thirty-four
102
percent share of the local inpatient market. Often deemed “must-have
providers,” these large hospitals carry additional leverage against health
insurers in that consumers will refuse to purchase insurance plans that do
103
not include them within their network. With ACOs thus far being
dominated by large hospitals, “the likely result will be a concentration of
power not in the most efficient and highest quality health care
organizations, but in the largest—simply because they control large
104
segments of the market share.”
At the same time, the unique characteristics of health care markets
place dominant providers in an even stronger bargaining position to
markup health care prices, practically eliminating any constraints on
pricing that might ordinarily be tied to consumers’ willingness or ability
105
to pay. Even in the absence of monopoly, the combination of health
insurance and a lack in price transparency enables and encourages
consumers and providers to overspend on costly health care by shielding
them from and largely removing the immediate cost factor from
106
treatment decisions that are paid for by insurers. To add to this, for
legal and regulatory reasons, health insurers in the United States must
typically reimburse whatever service is deemed “medically necessary”

98. Mass. Att’y Gen., Examination of Health Care Cost Trends and Cost Drivers Pursuant
to G.L. c. 118G, § 6½ (b) (2011).
99. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 47, at 871–72.
100. Thomas L. Greaney, Accountable Care Organizations—The Fork in the Road, 364 New Eng.
J. Med., at e1(1), e1(2) (2011).
101. Shaun E. Werbelow, Note, Rule of Reason Without a Rhyme: Using “Big Data” to Better
Analyze Accountable Care Organizations Under the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 90 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 361, 380 (2015).
102. See Christopher Lloyd, Moving Ahead with Memorial Hermann ACO and Beyond, Memorial
Hermann Physician Network Newslink, Winter 2013, at 1; see also Werbelow, supra note 101, at 379.
103. Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep Payment
Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 Health Aff. 973, 973 (2012).
104. Rita E. Numerof, Why Accountable Care Organizations Won’t Deliver Better Health Care—
and Market Innovation Will, Backgrounder, Apr. 18, 2011, at 2.
105. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 47, at 862.
106. Id.
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and “cannot refuse to pay the high prices imposed by health care
organizations, even when the price exceeds the likely value of the service
107
to the patient.” Indeed, due to confidentiality clauses and “gag clauses”
in provider insurer contracts, these prices are seldom disclosed to the
public, individual patients, or even the physicians that refer or provide
108
the health care services, and are often protected as trade secrets.
Although increases in pricing power might not impact Medicare’s
negotiated rates directly, they will have serious implications for the
private market. Because CMS dictates its own reimbursement rates to
doctors and hospitals, MSSP ACOs cannot exert market power by simply
raising Medicare prices. Medicare’s rates notwithstanding, most ACOs
are expected to operate in both the public and private market. As a
result, even if MSSP ACO providers are unable to use their market
power to increase prices for reimbursements to Medicare, there remains
a legitimate concern that they will then be able to shift costs to private
non-Medicare health insurance plans, and indeed, even be rewarded in
109
the form of shared savings. Moreover, Medicare is not without a stake
in these outcomes, as private market competition can have significant
110
impacts on Medicare programs, the MSSP included. To be sure, in a
study on the effect of provider concentration on Medicare payments,
MedPAC found that high hospital margins on private payer patients lead
to more construction and higher hospital costs, and that “when nonMedicare margins are high, hospitals face less pressure to constrain
111
costs.” MedPAC concluded that this association explains why hospital
Medicare margins tend to be low in the most concentrated markets,
112
while margins are higher where competition is greater. In addition, low
Medicare margins resulting from exercises of market power by dominant
providers may lead to higher Medicare costs because updates to hospital
administered pricing under prospective payment are sensitive to these
113
margins. Ultimately, if the risks of provider consolidation and market
concentration—justified under the auspices of the MSSP—are not
adequately addressed, they could undermine the very crux of the

107. See Barak D. Richman & Kevin A. Schulman, A Cautious Path Forward on Accountable Care
Organizations, 305 JAMA 602, 602 (2011).
108. See Morgan A. Muir et al., Clarifying Costs: Can Increased Price Transparency Reduce
Healthcare Spending?, 4 Wm. & Mary Pol’y Rev. 319, 327 (2013).
109. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 47, at 875.
110. See Thomas L. Greaney, Medicare Advantage, Accountable Care Organizations, and
Traditional Medicare: Synchronization or Collision? 15 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 37 (2014);
see also Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, Report to the Congress: Assessing Alternatives to
the Sustainable Growth Rate System, at xiv, 93–94 (2014).
111. See Greaney, supra note 110, at 53; see also Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, supra note 110.
112. See Greaney, supra note 110; see also Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, supra note 110.
113. See Greaney, supra note 110, at 54; see also Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, supra note 110.
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program and in turn, reduce or eliminate competitive incentives to
114
increase access and quality and lower costs.
2. Horizontal Price Fixing and Collusion
The consolidation of providers into ACOs also increases the risks of
horizontal price fixing, which “result[s] when competitors selling the
same products or services in the same or overlapping geographic
markets, agree, either directly or through a common agent negotiating on
their behalf, on the prices they will charge for their products or
115
services.” The risk of horizontal price fixing and other forms of
collusion is especially prominent among ACOs, which by definition are
encouraged to integrate, collaborate, and share information that might
116
include prices. Because ACOs are typically comprised of otherwise
independent competing providers, encouraging this collaboration might
incentivize and allow providers to fix prices when negotiating contracts
117
with commercial health plans. Although CMS administratively sets
provider reimbursement rates for Medicare beneficiaries, most MSSP
ACOs are expected to operate in both public and private markets, and
thus, even those ACOs participating in the MSSP can present a
118
heightened risk of horizontal price fixing and price collusion.
Considering that price fixing arrangements and other forms of
collusion implicated by the MSSP are per se illegal under the Sherman
119
Act, some might argue that existing antitrust laws are sufficient to deter
120
ACOs from engaging in this behavior. As discussed below in Part II.B,
however, current antitrust enforcement policy might allow for price
fixing in ACO arrangements, provided that network integration results in
net efficiencies and that the price agreements are necessary to achieve
121
those efficiencies. Additionally, even if ACO providers do not engage
in express horizontal price fixing, they may nonetheless negotiate jointly
114. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 22.
115. Patricia M. Bruns, An Antitrust Analysis of Accountable Care Organizations: Potential Abuses
from Allowing Reduced Scrutiny Under the Affordable Care Act, 28 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y
268, 271 (2012).
116. Bruns, supra note 115, at 271; see also Werbelow, supra note 101, at 375.
117. See Bruns, supra note 115, at 271.
118. See U.S. Dep’t Of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy
in Health Care 49–52 (1996), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0000.pdf (discussing antitrust
safety zones for provider participation in exchanges of price and cost information).
119. Generally, the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies which
unreasonably restrain competition. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2016). Under the Sherman
Act, certain business practices are considered so inherently anticompetitive that they are presumed
“per se illegal” without any additional inquiry as to the actual effect on the market. Alternatively,
other matters of concern are reviewed under the “rule of reason” standard which, as discussed infra
Part II.B.1, requires a more searching analysis that evaluates overall whether a practice is
anticompetitive.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
121. See Bruns, supra note 115, at 278.
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122

and collude on prices with private payers. Short of reaching an actual
agreement on prices, competing providers within ACOs are well
positioned to exchange or disseminate information that either relates to
123
or might affect the prices they charge. For example, ACOs may share
pricing and reimbursement surveys of all member provider charges and
dealings with health plans, allowing competing providers within the ACO
124
to use this information in negotiations with health plans. ACOs that
include multiple hospitals might also foster an environment in which
hospitals competing for specific types of employees would be able to
exchange information about wages, or in which competing hospitals
might exchange cost and price information on goods and services from
125
vendors. Given the ambiguities and related difficulties of current health
care antitrust enforcement, such conduct raises similar anticompetitive
concerns, but would not be as easily detectable and perhaps not be even
126
permitted under antitrust law.
B. Antitrust Treatment of MSSP ACOs
Many, if not most, provider markets today are characterized by high
levels of concentration due to repeated waves of increased merger and
127
acquisition activity stretching over the last thirty years. Some legal
analysts have attributed this failure to contain provider consolidation to
inconsistency and underenforcement of antitrust law by the federal
128
agencies. With respect to MSSP ACOs, there appears to be at least a
slight relaxation of typical antitrust enforcement, likely as a pragmatic
129
effort to avoid chilling provider participation in the program. However,
the primary concern with antitrust law might be that it is inherently
limited in its ability to alone deal with consolidation and market power in
the ACO context. This Subpart analyzes the current enforcement policy
guidance available for the MSSP, highlighting the aspects that reflect
relaxed antitrust treatment for MSSP ACOs. It then goes on to discuss
why it is difficult for antitrust law to address provider consolidation that
has already occurred and explains why antitrust law may not be the best
approach to prevent and address market power concerns that arise as a
result of the MSSP.

122. See Werbelow, supra note 101, at 376.
123. John J. Miles, 2 Health Care and Antitrust Law § 15:4 (2015).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Werbelow, supra note 101, at 376.
127. See Thomas L. Greaney, The Tangled Web: Integration, Exclusivity, and Market Power in
Provider Contracting, 14 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 59, 62 (2014).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 60.
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1. Antitrust Enforcement Policy
The agencies tasked with enforcing federal antitrust law, the DOJ
and the FTC, rely on rule-oriented regulation in their enforcement of
health care laws. Through policy statements, negotiated consent decrees,
advisory opinions and speeches, these agencies provide business
stakeholders guidance to outline and clarify their enforcement approach
130
to investigating particular types of transactions. Yet, in providing this
guidance, the agencies tread carefully so as to avoid being overly
prescriptive, occasionally resulting in ambiguous and uncertain enforcement
131
policies. As Professor Thomas Greaney has commented, this ambiguity
can cut two ways: “it can result in overdeterrence in the sense that
providers are reluctant to undertake procompetitive arrangements, or it
can cause under-deterrence, meaning providers will form over-inclusive
networks that have the power to charge supra competitive prices and
132
inhibit formation of rivalrous networks or ACOs.” Current federal
health care antitrust enforcement policies and practices suggest that the
latter approach seems to be the case thus far, and as this Subpart
discusses, the Antitrust Agencies may be affording too much special
treatment to MSSP ACOs.
Federal health care antitrust enforcement policy is, for the most
part, laid out in the Antitrust Agencies’ joint Statements of Antitrust
133
Enforcement Policy in Health Care (“Health Care Statement”). In
reviewing most health care provider mergers and collaborations, the
enforcement agencies consider several threshold questions: (1) Whether
the proposed arrangements offer the potential for consumer cost savings
or health care quality improvements; (2) Whether providers are seeking
to establish a bona fide integration, or merely seeking to enhance
leverage with payers through joint negotiation; and (3) Whether any
price agreements or other agreements regarding dealing with insurers are
reasonably necessary to achieve the efficiencies and other benefits of the
134
arrangement. If the answer to each of these questions is “yes,” the
arrangement is not considered per se illegal, and instead is evaluated
under the “rule of reason” standard, which assesses whether the likely
procompetitive effects of the arrangement outweigh the anticompetitive
135
This rule of reason analysis generally follows the same
harms.
framework outlined in the Antitrust Agencies’ joint Horizontal Merger

130. Id. at 88–89.
131. Id. at 89.
132. Id. at 88.
133. U.S. Dep’t Of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 118.
134. Deborah L. Feinstein, Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at Fifth
Washington, D.C.: Antitrust Enforcement in
National Accountable Care Organization Summit
Health Care: Proscription, Not Prescription 4 (June 19, 2014).
135. Id.

—
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Guidelines,
“defining relevant product and geographic markets,
identifying market participants, calculating market shares and
concentration, considering the likelihood of expansion by existing
players or entry by new players, and determining whether efficiencies
137
will likely result.”
The Antitrust Agencies relaxed these policies for evaluating health
care transactions even further in considering the antitrust implications of
MSSP ACOs. The enforcement policies applied specifically to the MSSP
are outlined in the Antitrust Agencies joint “Statement of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program” (“MSSP
138
Statement”). Through this statement, the Agencies attempt to strike a
balance between (1) clarifying review procedures and standards to
encourage, rather than deter, procompetitive arrangements; and
(2) exercising effective oversight over anticompetitive effects, such as
139
consolidation, that might lessen competition in private markets. As stated
in a portion of the MSSP Statement:
The antitrust laws treat naked price-fixing and market-allocation
agreements among competitors as per se illegal. Joint price agreements
among competing health care providers are evaluated under the rule of
reason, however, if the providers are financially or clinically integrated
and the agreement is reasonably necessary to accomplish the
140
procompetitive benefits of the integration.

On the issue of clinical integration, the agencies chose to defer to
CMS’s eligibility criteria, determining that meeting these requirements is
largely “consistent with the indicia of clinical integration” set forth in
prior antitrust advisory opinions, and that organizations eligible for the
MSSP “are reasonably likely to be bona fide arrangements intended to
improve the quality and reduce the costs, of providing medical and other
141
health care services.” Accordingly, ACOs meeting CMS’s standard for
participation in the MSSP are presumed to meet the above threshold
considerations and are automatically reviewed under the rule of reason
142
standard as opposed to the per se standard of illegality. Furthermore,
where ACOs are deemed eligible for the MSSP, joint negotiations with
private payers will be treated as reasonably necessary to an ACO’s

136. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines are the set of policies published as guidance by the
Antitrust Agencies concerning their approach to investigating and reviewing horizontal acquisitions
and mergers for antitrust issues. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (2010).
137. Feinstein, supra note 134.
138. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, supra note 18.
139. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 22.
140. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, supra note 18, at 67,027.
141. Id. at 67,027–28.
142. Id. at 67,027.
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primary purpose of improving health care delivery. Thus, through these
statements, the antitrust enforcement agencies afford special relaxed
treatment to mergers and collaborations among health care providers to
form MSSP ACOs, assuming that once an ACO is formed, such
transactions were adequately geared toward—and essential to—legitimate
goals of increased efficiency.
The MSSP Statement represents a significant departure from prior
agency enforcement policies. Previously, the FTC was responsible for
making these sorts of determinations regarding clinical integration on a
144
case-by-case basis. Under the MSSP Statement, however, the decision
is largely taken out of the agencies’ hands, such that CMS eligibility
approval “essentially amounts to an ex ante finding of sufficient
integration—and procompetitive justification—to their analysis of
145
commercial markets.” By adopting this deferential approach, the
enforcement agencies have opted for a more pragmatic standard. While
less rigorous, it encourages program participation by dispelling the
146
uncertainty of a multifactor, case-by-case evaluation.
The Enforcement Statement also establishes a “safety zone” for
MSSP ACOs consisting of multiple independent participants, including
147
ACOs that plan to operate in the private commercial market. For an
MSSP ACO to fall within the safety zone, “independent ACO
participants that provide the same service . . . must have a combined
share of 30 percent or less of each common service in each participant’s
[primary service area], wherever two or more ACO participants provide
148
that service to patients from that PSA.” A primary service area
(“PSA”) is defined as “the lowest number of postal zip codes from which
the [ACO participant] draws at least 75 percent of its [patients]” and is
the metric the Antitrust Agencies uses to define the geographic limits in
149
which market concentration is measured. Additionally, regardless of its
PSA, “any hospital or ambulatory surgery center (“ASC”) participating
in an ACO must be nonexclusive to the ACO to fall within the safety
150
zone.” ACOs meeting these requirements are deemed “highly unlikely
to raise significant competitive concerns,” and except under
extraordinary circumstances, the enforcement agencies will not challenge

143. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 23.
144. Douglas E. Rosenthal et al., Affordable Care Act Signals New Direction for Antitrust
Enforcement in Healthcare, Bureau Nat’l Aff. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep., June 24, 2011, at 5.
145. Id.
146. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 25.
147. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, supra note 18, at 67,032.
148. Id. at 67,028.
149. Id. The geographic region a PSA defines has no relationship to the “geographic market”
defined in a standard antitrust merger review.
150. Id. at 67,028–29.
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151

them. Nonetheless, ACOs that fall outside of the safety zone might still
152
be procompetitive and legal.
First, the MSSP Statement describes conduct to avoid regardless of
whether PSA shares fall inside or outside the safety zones:
Regardless of an ACO’s PSA shares or other indicia of market power,
significant competitive concerns can arise when an ACO’s operations
lead to price-fixing or other collusion among ACO participants in their
sale of competing services outside the ACO. For example, improper
exchanges of prices or other competitively sensitive information among
competing participants could facilitate collusion and reduce competition
in the provision of services outside the ACO, leading to increased prices
or reduced quality or availability of health care services. ACOs should
refrain from, and implement appropriate firewalls or other safeguards
against, conduct that may facilitate collusion among ACO participants
153
in the sale of competing services outside the ACO.

For ACOs with high PSA shares or signs of market power, the
Antitrust Agencies identify four types of conduct that may raise
anticompetitive concerns because they “may prevent private payers from
154
obtaining lower prices and better quality service for their enrollees.”
The conduct to avoid includes:
(1) Preventing or discouraging private payers from directing or
incentivizing patients to choose certain providers, including providers
that do not participate in the ACO, through “anti-steering,” “antitiering,” “guaranteed inclusion,” “most-favored-nation,” or similar
contractual clauses or provisions.
(2) Tying sales (either explicitly or implicitly through pricing
policies) of the ACO’s services to the private payer’s purchase of other
services from providers outside the ACO (and vice versa), including
providers affiliated with an ACO participant (for example, an ACO
should not require a purchaser to contract with all of the hospitals
under common ownership with a hospital that participates in the ACO).
(3) Contracting on an exclusive basis with ACO physicians,
hospitals, ASCs, or other providers, thereby preventing or discouraging
those providers from contracting with private payers outside the ACO,
either individually or through other ACOs or analogous collaborations.
(4) Restricting a private payer’s ability to make available to its
health plan enrollees cost, quality, efficiency, and performance
information to aid enrollees in evaluating and selecting providers in the
health plan, if that information is similar to the cost, quality, efficiency,
155
and performance measures used in the Shared Savings Program.

151. “Extraordinary circumstances” may include, “for example, ACO participants engaging in
collusion or improper exchanges of price information or other competitively sensitive information with
respect to their sale of competing services outside the ACO.” Id. at 67,028 n.24.
152. Id. at 67,028.
153. Id. at 67,029.
154. Id. at 67,030.
155. Id.
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Overall, stakeholders and commentators view the provisions
delineating antitrust safety zones and other high risk behavior as a slight
156
to moderate relaxation of the antitrust laws. Of particular concern is
the use of PSA as the primary measure of market power in the safety
zones, as the Antitrust Agencies admittedly state that PSA “does not
157
necessarily constitute a relevant antitrust geographic market.” As one
commentator has warned, this could “inevitably result in unintended
consequences not stemming from competitive influences,” and that, for
example, PSA shares might be sensitive to changes in patient
158
demographics. Furthermore, Thomas Greaney notes that the areas of
conduct identified as raising competitive concerns require “notoriously high
evidentiary burdens” and that these issues involve unsettled areas of the law
159
that will be even more complicated in the ACO context.
Critics of the MSSP regulatory framework also emphasize that
neither the Enforcement Statement nor other existing regulations impose
any form of premerger review by the enforcement agencies, and instead,
any newly formed ACO seeking additional guidance must voluntarily
160
request expedited review. As a result, antitrust review is relegated to
the aftermath of provider consolidation and any anticompetitive effects
161
that result. Considering many anticompetitive effects might not be
apparent until well after providers consolidate under the MSSP,
participating providers might ultimately enhance their bargaining power
162
with little danger of later being broken up. Overall, current antitrust
enforcement policy, as reflected in the MSSP Statement and the
regulatory efforts of CMS, does not go far enough to prevent
consolidation. The next Subpart explains why the Antitrust Agencies
have and will continue to find it inherently difficult to limit providers that
are permitted to consolidate from acting on any resulting increases in
market power.
2. The Limits of Antitrust Law
As discussed above, relatively light antitrust enforcement policy will
allow most MSSP ACOs, including those involving potentially dangerous
provider mergers, to survive agency review. Once a merged entity has
gained market power, however, the Antitrust Agencies might find it
extremely difficult to later either undo the underlying merger or prevent
the exercise of that market power. Indeed, a common misunderstanding

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See Bruns, supra note 115, at 271; see also Greaney, supra note 12, at 5–6.
Bruns, supra note 115, at 281.
Id. at 282.
Bruns, supra note 115, at 284–87; see also Greaney, supra note 12, at 31.
Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, supra note 18, at 67,030.
See Werbelow, supra note 101, at 389.
See Greaney, supra note 12, at 27.
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among policymakers is that antitrust law can reliably counteract legally
163
acquired monopoly power. Thus far, no MSSP ACOs have been the
subject of antitrust challenges. However, several antitrust actions in the
health care industry within the past several years reflect the difficulty in
addressing consolidation after it has already occurred.
Once a merger has been consummated and is later found to be
anticompetitive, the Antitrust Agencies’ preferred remedy is to require
that a portion of the surviving entity be divested, or sold, to reduce the
merged entities market power. While the Agencies have each had some
success in bringing actions for divestiture, this particular remedy can
164
have limited applicability and effectiveness in restoring competition.
This is best demonstrated by the FTC’s retrospective challenge of
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation’s (“Evanston”) acquisition
165
of Highland Park Hospital in the Chicago, Illinois, area in 2000. After
bringing the challenge in 2004, the FTC found strong evidence that
Evanston had significantly raised prices throughout the local market
166
without improving the quality of care. By the time the FTC resolved
the action in 2007, however, significant integration had already occurred
and divestiture posed a potential risk to patient safety. As a result, the
FTC ultimately concluded that it would be impossible to return the two
providers to their premerger status and had little choice but to allow the
167
merger to persist. In the context of the MSSP, there is the same
possibility that “strong evidence” of anticompetitive effects will not be
available until years after formation and operation, especially
considering the fact that MSSP ACOs are not required to collect and
168
disclose data pertaining to non-Medicare beneficiaries. As in the
Evanston case, divestitures among MSSP ACO providers might not even
be a practical remedy to reverse problematic consolidation where
substantial and irreversible integration has occurred, and will depend on
the availability of data and other evidence of anticompetitive effects.
More recently, the FTC’s challenge of a merger between two
physician groups in Idaho illustrated the complications that can arise
169
even in the aftermath of a divestiture order. In 2012, St. Luke’s Health
System, a system with four hospitals and both employed and affiliated
physicians throughout Idaho, acquired Saltzer Medical Group, the
170
largest multi-specialty physician group in Idaho. The resulting entity
163. See id. at 27–28.
164. See Feinstein, supra note 134, at 14.
165. See In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, slip op. at 35 (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 2007).
166. Id.
167. See Bays, supra note 58, at 15.
168. See Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 C.F.R. § 425 (2016); Medicare Shared Savings
Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,841–43 (Nov. 2, 2011).
169. See St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 778 F.3d 775, 781–82 (9th Cir. 2015).
170. Id.
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both had a strong reputation and possessed eighty percent of the adult
primary care physicians in Nampa, Idaho, empowering it with significant
bargaining leverage over health insurance companies to negotiate higher
171
reimbursement rates. The court agreed with the FTC that this would
produce anticompetitive effects in the form of higher premiums for
consumers and ordered a divestiture, a decision that was affirmed by the
172
Ninth Circuit in February of 2012. With nearly a year having passed
since that order, and three years since the merger was consummated, St.
Luke’s has yet to comply with the order and recently reported that
“‘what may have seemed like a simple, straightforward process at the
173
time that divestiture was ordered, has proven not to be so.’”
This dispute reflects the primary difficulty with the divestiture of a
large health care entity: finding an appropriate buyer that has the
resources to not only purchase, but also to maintain, a complex network
174
To add to these
of relationships among payers and patients.
complications, there is increasing evidence that divestitures often fail to
fully restore competition. For example, a recent study by Northeastern
University Professor John Kwoka examined decades of reliable empirical
studies of the effect of mergers, finding that divestitures often failed to
preserve competition and were not generally effective in restraining price
175
increases. Most of the mergers Professor Kwoka examined resulted in
competitive harm, which usually took the form of increased prices. In
fact, “[f]or all cases in which the agencies challenged mergers, the
176
More
outcome was . . . an average price increase of 7.71[%].”
specifically, divestiture remedies were associated with price increases of
6.11%, indicating they are at least moderately inadequate, while conduct
remedies resulted in price increases of 12.81%, “suggesting that these are
177
largely ineffective in restraining post-merger price increases.” Other
significant findings included an estimated 4% decrease in quality and a

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Lisa Schencker, Court-Ordered Breakup Is Still Hard to Do, Modern Healthcare (July 17,
2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150717/NEWS/150719929. On December 10, 2015,
the Federal District Court of Idaho issued an order setting a deadline of sixty days to complete St.
Luke’s divestiture of its Saltzer assets and appointing a trustee to facilitate the transaction in the event
St. Luke’s fails to do so. See Order to Maintain Assets and Appointing a Monitor and a Divestiture
Tr., Nos. 1:12-cv-00560-BLW, 1:13-cv-00116-BLW (Dist. Ct. Idaho, Dec. 10, 2015).
174. The State of Competition in the Health Care Marketplace: The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act’s Impact on Competition: Hearing on Health Consolidation Before the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Thomas L Greaney, Professor of Law at Saint Louis
University School of Law).
175. John Kwoka, Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Retrospective Analysis of
U.S. Policy 156 (2015) (discussing divestiture remedies in product markets associated with price
increases).
176. Id. at 159.
177. Id.
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178

9.73% decrease in research and development. Tellingly, challenged
mergers that were eventually permitted through consent agreements
resulted in price increases that, on average, were no less than those
179
where a merger was cleared from the start. As these results make clear,
Professor Kwoka’s study supports the inference that enforcement actions
by the Antitrust Agencies “are not demonstrably effective in preventing
180
post-merger harm.”
Thus, divestiture might not always provide a reliable solution for
consolidation under the MSSP that is later found to be anticompetitive,
especially considering the complex nature of ACO arrangements among
providers, Medicare, and other private health plans. Where structural
remedies such as divestiture are not practical, the Antitrust Agencies
resort to “conduct” or “behavioral” remedies that place conditions on
the merged entity, including price caps, limits on future acquisitions,
rules for contracting with providers, and government monitoring and
181
oversight. The Antitrust Agencies, however, have rarely employed
conduct remedies such as these because they not only rely on resourceintensive enforcement, but also fail to address the underlying problem of
182
reduced competition where a merger is permitted.
The success of health care reform will largely depend on
competitive markets, and if the MSSP is to achieve its goal of controlling
health care costs and improving quality, it will require stricter antitrust
enforcement. Given the inherent difficulties that antitrust law will face in
both imposing and implementing such remedies, the simple conclusion
might be to “just say no” to consolidation where large providers are
183
Nonetheless, some degree of consolidation might be
involved.
beneficial and in line with the goals of health care reform. Keeping this in
mind, the next Part proposes modifications to the current MSSP
regulatory scheme that would not only improve regulatory efforts to
178. Id. at 156–57.
179. Id. at 159.
180. Id.
181. See Feinstein, supra note 134, at 14–15.
182. For example, earlier this year, in Commonwealth v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc., a
Massachusetts court rejected a settlement agreement between merging hospitals and the state attorney
general. Commonwealth v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. SUCV2014-02033-BLS2, 2015 WL
500995 (Mass. Super. Ct., Jan. 30, 2015). The court explained that such a conduct remedy “permits
consolidation and then attempts to limit the consequences that flow from that by imposing certain
restrictions on the defendant’s behavior” and thus “require[s] constant and vigilant monitoring.” Id. at
22, 25. The court further stated that “the remedies that are proposed are temporary and limited in
scope—like putting a band-aid on a gaping wound that will only continue to bleed (perhaps even more
profusely) once the band-aid is taken off.” Id. at 2. See also Press Release, Martha Healey Mass. Att’y
Gen., AG Final Resolution with Partners Would Alter Provider’s Negotiating Power, Restrict Growth
and Health Costs (June 24, 2014) (on file with author).
183. See David A. Balto, Health Insurance Merger Frenzy: Why DOJ Must Just Say ‘No,’ Law360
(Aug. 17, 2015, 5:59 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/683500/health-insurance-merger-frenzy-whydoj-must-just-say-no.
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prevent anticompetitive consolidation, but also better position CMS and
the Antitrust Agencies to jointly mitigate harms that might arise where
consolidation is permitted.
III. Leveraging MSSP Eligibility to Address Pricing Power
Certainly, the DOJ and FTC have a critical role to play in the
ongoing health care reforms, but it is important to recognize what these
agencies can and cannot do. As the previous Part makes clear, the
Antitrust Agencies’ enforcement efforts may serve a crucial role in
preventing mergers outside the MSSP Statement safety zones, as well as
specific types of anticompetitive conduct within MSSP ACOs. Yet,
where providers have already consolidated, an antitrust approach is
inherently limited in that it cannot address legitimate exercises of pricing
power and will encounter difficulty in reversing or applying other
184
remedies to a merger that is later found to be anticompetitive.
Furthermore, relying on antitrust litigation for issues of anticompetitive
contractual agreements, tying arrangements, and exclusionary
contracting involves unsettled areas of the law that are perhaps too fact
185
intensive, expensive, and time consuming to be practical. Ultimately,
both the antitrust policy outlined in the MSSP Statement first discussed
in Part II of this Note as well as current MSSP regulations focus too
much on post-merger remedies that are not well suited to address the
underlying problems associated with extant provider market power.
Considering the difficulties of resolving these issues with antitrust law
alone, the best solution for preventing anticompetitive consolidation and
market power is a more comprehensive regulatory approach to the
MSSP framework itself.
In June 2015, CMS issued the second Final Rule to the MSSP (“2015
Final Rule”), amending regulations last updated in November 2011
186
(“2011 Final Rule”). Among the key provisions, the rule allowed MSSP
ACOs in the Track One to remain there for a total of up to six years,
refined the beneficiary assignment model, established a new Track Three
risk model, and introduced alternative methods for establishing and
187
updating financial benchmarks. Understandably, policymakers were
concerned with maintaining and encouraging further participation in the
MSSP program, and for good reason. Despite proposing many much
needed adjustments to the program, however, the 2015 Final Rule falls
short in that it again dismissed the problem of market consolidation and
pricing power among MSSP ACOs.
184. Greaney, supra note 12, at 34–35.
185. Id. at 35.
186. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 C.F.R. § 425 (2015).
187. Jessica L. Russell, Will the ACO Proposed Rule Save the Shared Savings Program?, Lexology (Feb.
20, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5c26d36a-4b6c-4693-91c3-640445d0d05d.
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As discussed above in Part I, the ACO model is unique, has already
enjoyed a moderate degree of success, and has the potential to transform
the U.S. health care system to not only deliver better quality, but also
more affordable health care. And because ACOs are experimental in
nature, some relaxation of antitrust policy and a cautious regulatory
framework are not only reasonable, but to an extent necessary. However,
this deferential system of antitrust review should not be allowed to
continue in this fashion considering the risk of potentially irreversible
188
Under these
effects on health care competition and pricing.
circumstances, the MSSP is severely in need of protections that not only
scrutinize and prohibit potentially anticompetitive consolidation, but also
position both CMS and the Antitrust Agencies to more effectively
mitigate the risks of consolidation where it is permitted.
Given the success and growth in the MSSP in just its first three
years, this Note proposes that CMS address the provider consolidation
and market power problem by revising its eligibility requirements. More
specifically, CMS should further condition a prospective ACO’s
participation in the MSSP on the ACO’s disclosure of additional data,
information, and agreements, relating to both public and private payers
and patients. This Part first details the concepts of mandatory and
voluntary antitrust review under the MSSP, the two mechanisms that
were intended—but in their own ways, have failed—to address antitrust
concerns. It then proposes that CMS draw from both review systems in
modeling a framework for mandatory disclosures and discusses what
these might include. These recommendations attempt to strike the
appropriate balance between the rigidity of mandatory antitrust review,
and the impracticality of an unused system of voluntary review. In doing
so, regulation and enforcement efforts by CMS and the Antitrust Agencies
could better synergize to avoid chilling potentially procompetitive ACO
arrangements while also accounting for the limits of antitrust policy in
reversing or preventing the exercise of provider pricing power.
A. “Mandatory” and “Voluntary” Antitrust Review
Throughout the notice and comment period preceding the 2015
Final Rule, many commentators suggested that a possible solution for
addressing the consolidation and pricing power problem could be to
evaluate ACOs for market power as a condition of acceptance into the
189
This notion of “mandatory review,” however, is not
program.
necessarily a new suggestion. Indeed, one of the most significant
shortcomings of the original 2011 Final Rule was CMS’s decision to drop
188. See Berenson, supra note 7, at 720.
189. Travis Broome, Stakeholders Agree on Major Updates to the Medicare Shared Savings Program,
Am. J. Accountable Care (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.ajmc.com/publications/AJAC/2015/2015-vol3-n1/
Stakeholders-Agree-on-Major-Updates-to-the-Medicare-Shared-Savings-Program#sthash.1Cobi4Pw.dpuf.
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a proposed mandatory antitrust review process as a prerequisite for entry
190
to the MSSP. CMS originally envisioned mandatory review as a way to
subject ACOs comprised of dominant providers to close antitrust
191
scrutiny. In doing so, such a process would discourage and prevent the
formation of ACOs poised to gain significant market power, while also
providing the antitrust agencies with additional information to deal with
192
193
anticompetitive conduct early on. In the proposed 2011 rule, CMS
asserted that such a process would encourage private market competition
while upholding the interest of Medicare:
First, it would ensure that ACOs participating in the Shared Savings
Program would not present competitive problems that could subject
them to antitrust challenge that may prevent them from completing the
term of their agreement with us. Second, it would maintain
competition for the benefit of Medicare beneficiaries by reducing the
potential for the creation of ACOs with market power. In this context
market power refers to the ability of an ACO to reduce the quality of
care furnished to Medicare beneficiaries and/or to raise prices or
reduce the quality for commercial health plans and enrollees, thereby
potentially increasing providers’ incentives to provide care for private
enrollees of higher-paying health plans rather than for Medicare
beneficiaries . . . . Furthermore, competition benefits the Shared
Savings Program by allowing the opportunity for the formation of two
or more ACOs in an area. Competition among ACOs can accelerate
advancements in quality and efficiency. All of these benefits to
Medicare patients would be reduced or eliminated if we were to allow
ACOs to participate in the Shared Savings Program when their
194
formation and participation would create market power.

In its 2011 Final Rule, however, CMS and the enforcement agencies
withdrew the mandatory review requirement after receiving a number of
195
criticisms. Some commenters argued that mandatory review presented
subdelegation concerns under the Administrative Procedure Act by
conveying unreviewable authority to the Antitrust Agencies to refuse
MSSP applicants, when the U.S. Department of Health and Human
196
Others
Services alone was attributed oversight of the program.
objected that the process would be time-consuming and costly for the
197
Agencies, while also imposing entry-inhibiting costs on ACOs. Finally,
190. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,841–44 (Nov. 2, 2011).
191. Id.
192. Greaney, supra note 12, at 32.
193. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,841–42.
194. Id.
195. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 33.
196. Under the ‘‘subdelegation doctrine,’’ courts limited the ability of federal agencies to transfer
their statutory authority to third-party entities, including other federal agencies. Richard D. Raskin et
al., Delegation Dilemma: Can HHS Require Medicare ACOs to Undergo Pre-Clearance by the Antitrust
Agencies?, Health L. Rep. (BNA), June 23, 2011, at 2; see also Greaney, supra note 12, at 33.
197. See Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,841–42; see also Greaney, supra
note 12, at 33.
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some commenters argued that it would simply be “bad public policy to
change the nature of antitrust enforcement from law enforcement to a
198
regulatory regime.” For the most part, the critics of mandatory review
made a number of legitimate points; however, by completely discarding
this mandatory review process, CMS precluded the opportunity to
negotiate with prospective MSSP participants and insist upon binding
conditions of participation as is commonly done in consent decrees and
199
merger cases, as discussed further below.
In place of mandatory review, CMS implemented a system of
200
voluntary expedited antitrust review. Under voluntary review, newly
formed MSSP ACOs seeking additional guidance can voluntarily request
201
expedited review to be completed within ninety days. Then, to the
extent possible in the ninety day review period, the Antitrust Agencies
will consider factors in the rule of reason analysis and provide guidance
202
as to whether the MSSP ACO presents any concern for further review.
The advantage of a voluntary system of antitrust review is immediately
apparent: it is significantly less burdensome for both the ACOs and the
Antitrust Agencies. Furthermore, the voluntary disclosure process
requires that ACOs monitor and produce a wealth of documentation and
other information, including: (1) the MSSP application and all supporting
documents that the ACO plans to submit, or has submitted, to CMS;
(2) documents discussing the ACO’s business strategies or plans to
compete in the Medicare and commercial markets; and (3) any other
documents and information an ACO believes might be helpful to the
203
Agency in assessing the ACO’s likely impact on competition.
In opting for the voluntary review process, CMS lost a crucial
opportunity to screen potentially anticompetitive ACOs, as well as to
negotiate agreements to prevent these organizations from using their size
to drive up prices in the commercial market. Furthermore, opting for this
process precluded CMS from streamlining the collection of the types of
data listed above. Despite the many useful items of information listed as
required in the voluntary review process, as one legal analyst observed,
“it is highly unlikely that an ACO engaging in anticompetitive behaviors
204
is going to voluntarily seek expedited review.” Since the inception of

198. See Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,841–42.
199. Id.
200. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, supra note 18.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Examples of such documents include those relating to the ACO’s likely impact on the prices,
cost, or quality of any service provided by the ACO to Medicare beneficiaries, commercial health
plans, or other payers, and the level and nature of competition among participants in the ACO, and
the competitive significance of the ACO and ACO participants in the markets in which they provide
services. Id. at 67,031.
204. See Bruns, supra note 115, at 286.
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voluntary expedited review, only two ACOs have requested review,
and of those two applicants, one withdrew its request prior to the actual
review, and the other was not eligible because the applicant did not
206
intend to operate in any commercial market. Thus, despite the fact that
voluntary review can potentially gather useful information and is
generally less burdensome, it does not serve the purpose preliminary
review intended.
B. Implementing a Policy of Mandatory Disclosures
While imposing either mandatory or voluntary antitrust review
upon prospective MSSP ACOs entails a number of tradeoffs, the reality
is that neither is a practical solution to the ACO consolidation problem.
As noted in the above Subpart, CMS instituting a system of mandatory
review is complicated by the constitutional issue of nondelegation, while
the current practice of voluntary review has yet to be used and thus
serves more of a guiding role than a structured protection against either
consolidation or market power. Accordingly, regardless of whether
voluntary review remains an option, there is a need for regulatory
requirements that are systematically imposed upon applicant ACOs in a
way that prevents the harms of pricing power before they become
irreversible or unavoidable.
Drawing from both the mandatory and voluntary review processes
outlined above, the most promising quality they collectively offer in
combatting provider market power is the disclosure and compiling of
empirical data and other information. By requiring mandatory
disclosures of select information similar to that required in the voluntary
review process, CMS could better monitor and make possible additional
and more effective regulatory actions. For example, as opposed to a
voluntary disclosure to an antitrust agency, CMS could require that
applicants provide documentation in support of their purported business
goals and strategies in both the Medicare and commercial markets. This
information might include the ACO’s expected impact on prices, cost, or
quality in both public and private markets, as well as an overview of the
competition the ACO expects to face. Indeed, already in the 2015 Final
Rule, CMS imposed a requirement that ACOs monitor, collect, and
207
disclose claims data with respect to its Medicare beneficiaries.

205. Deborah L. Feinstein et al., Accountable Care Organizations and Antitrust Enforcement:
Promoting Competition and Innovation, 40 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 873, 875 n.2 (2015).
206. FTC & Dep’t of Justice ACO Working Grp., Summary of Activities Following Issuance
of the Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (2013).
207. See 42 C.F.R. § 425 (2016); see also Medicare Shared Savings Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 32,692,
32,818–19 (2015).
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Moreover, CMS also conditioned MSSP participation on an ACO’s
agreement that this claims information be disclosed to the Antitrust
208
By expanding the scope of the MSSP Participation
Agencies.
Agreement in manners such as these, CMS would be able to accomplish
two major goals. First, CMS would be able to proactively and more
reliably track the progress and development of MSSP ACOs in a way
that would hold participants more accountable for the program’s mission
for health care reform, and such that CMS could intervene before
substantial harm results from acquisition of market power. Second, as
discussed in Part II above, antitrust rule of reason analysis is extremely
fact specific and resource intensive. By gathering select information,
CMS would be in a better position to not only flag arrangements of
potential concern, but to streamline the process for antitrust review by
sharing that information with the Antitrust Agencies.
CMS should also consider imposing a number of affirmative
obligations on the part of participant ACOs where, unless an ACO
engaged in certain anticompetitive behaviors or abuses of pricing power,
these obligations would not burden its operations or prospects for
success. For example, requiring commitments, such as price increase
caps, would account for the inherent difficulty in providing antitrust
remedies down the road, as was the result in the Evanston case discussed
above in Part II.B. A number of commentators have raised several
possible measures since the MSSP came into effect. First, CMS might
also demand a heightened showing that ACO proposals will produce
identifiable and quantifiable efficiencies, as well as perhaps placing the
burden of showing an absence of significant horizontal anticompetitive
209
effects on the applicant. Another approach might involve punitive
action to ensure ACO participants were entering into the MSSP for the
right reasons. For example, CMS could set limits on price increases in the
commercial market and require that increases exceeding certain
benchmarks be justified in the way an insurance rate review commission
210
might operate. Alternatively, CMS might incorporate monetary penalties
to shared savings not only where quality or financial benchmarks are not
met, but where prices to private payers increase beyond a certain extent
211
and cannot be justified. And lastly, CMS could expand upon its
gatekeeper role of accepting ACOs into the program to include conditional
renewals or denials for future years based on whether participants were
212
raising prices or consolidating market power.

208. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 80 Fed. Reg. at 32,818–19.
209. See Richman, supra note 96, at 11.
210. See Erin Fuse Brown & Jaime King, State Oversight of Vertical Integration in Health Care
(Dec. 7, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
211. Id.
212. See Greaney, supra note 12, at 38.
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Overall, the regulatory framework governing the MSSP is in need of
serious revisions that address provider consolidation and market power
from the onset. By conditioning MSSP eligibility on the disclosure of
data, information, and various agreements extending to the private
sector as discussed above, CMS could better detect, preclude, and
respond to antitrust concerns that have historically correlated with
213
increases in provider concentration. Providers would likely raise concerns
that tightening and adding to the MSSP regulations could make it overly
burdensome, thereby chilling participation. Any burden in additional
data collection, however, could likely be minimized with the use of
existing medical and claims data that is already routinely and automatically
generated for private patients by hospitals and health insurance
214
companies. More importantly, the limited burden of information and
data disclosures would greatly improve both CMS and the Antitrust
Agencies’ ability to work jointly in addressing unintended concentrations of
pricing power that could undermine the MSSP’s “three-part aim” of
215
improved care delivery, improved health, and reduced growth in costs.
Conclusion
Under the MSSP, ACOs have the potential to lead the
transformation of the U.S. health care system from fragmented and costly
to integrated and cost efficient. Yet, the same integration that promises
coordination and efficiency stands to aggregate and concentrate market
power in a way that diminishes competition and drives up prices. As this
Note argues, enforcement by the Antitrust Agencies alone remains
inadequate and is not even the best solution to the MSSP’s provider
market power problem. While there is perhaps a need for stricter
antitrust policy, additional regulatory efforts by CMS are necessary to
prevent excessive and unnecessary health care provider consolidation, and
at the very least, to place both CMS and the Antitrust Agencies in a better
position to monitor, mitigate, and contain anticompetitive exercises of
market power.

213. See supra Part II.A.
214. Patrick B. Miller et al., All-Payer Claims Databases: An Overview for Policymakers 7–
8 (2010) (discussing challenges to data collection for all-payer claims databases, state established
databases that collect health insurance claims information for every health care payer in a given state).
215. Accountable Care Organization (ACO), Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/index.html?redirect=/Aco (last
visited Apr. 8, 2016).

